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The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet
By JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN*
TIE French artist Bernard Buffet was invited to decorate a refrigera-
ator to be auctioned in Paris for the benefit of charity. He did so by
painting a composition consisting of six panels: three on the front, one
on the top, and one on each side of the refrigerator. He considered the
six panels parts of one painting and signed only one of them. The
refrigerator was duly auctioned along with nine others, decorated by
nine other artists, at the Galerie Charpentier. Six months later the
catalog for another auction included a "Still Life With Fruits" by
Bernard Buffet, illustrated and described as a painting on metal. In-
spection showed that the painting was one of the panels decorating the
front of the refrigerator. The artist brought an action against the
owner-consignor to prevent the separate sale of the panel, and the court
so ordered.'
* B.S., 1943, University of Portland; M.S., 1944, J.D., 1947, University of Notre
Dame; LL.M., 1951, J.S.D., 1955, New York University. Sweitzer Professor of Law,
Stanford University.
Gilbert S. Edelson, Albert E. Elsen, Paul Goldstein, Melville B. Nimmer, and
Stephen E. Well thoughtfully criticized an earlier draft of this article, and Stefano
Rodota, Sabino Cassese, and Jean-Louis Goutal gave expert advice on European law. The
author is grateful for their generous assistance.
@ 1976, John Henry Merryman.
1. The judgment of the Tribunal de la grande instance de la Seine of June 7, 1960
is contained in the report of the appellate court decision. Buffet v. Fersing, [1962]
Recueil Dalloz ID. Jur.] 570, 571 (Cour d'appel, Paris). The tribunal also awarded Mr.
Buffet symbolic damages of one new franc, the right to publish its decision in three art
periodicals of his choice at the defendant's expense, and costs. It refused the artist's
request that the six panels be awarded to him as damages. Mr. Buffet appealed on two
principal grounds. First, he contended that the tribunal had erred in limiting the order
to the defendant to public disposition of the work on a piecemeal basis, holding that only
such a public dismemberment of the work was a sufficiently grave impairment of the
artist's moral right to warrant the limitation of defendant's right of property that the
relief requested necessarily entailed. The court of appeal agreed with the artist on this
point and revised the judgment to prohibit even private piece-by-piece disposition.
Second, he contended that the tribunal should have awarded the six panels to him. On
this point the court of appeal agreed with the tribunal that such relief was unwarranted.
There is a thoughtful note on the case by Professor Henri Desbois. See id. at 572.
[1023]
Guille, a painter, agreed to deliver to Colmant, a dealer, his entire
future production for a period of ten years, at a rate of at least twenty
paintings a month. The contract provided that the works furnished to
the dealer would be signed with a pseudonym and that the painter
would not sign the earlier works still in his possession. There was no
evidence that the artist entered the agreement under duress or that he
lacked capacity to contract. A dispute eventually arose, and the dealer
sued the artist for breach of contract. The court of appeals held that
the dealer could not prohibit the artist from using his real name in
connection with works he created, despite the terms of the contract.2
In 1893 Lord Eden commissioned the American artist James
McNeill Whistler, then living in Paris, to paint Lady Eden's portrait.
Through intermediaries they agreed on a price "between" 100 and 150
guineas. Whistler eventually completed the portrait, which he exhibited
(with Eden's approval) at the Salon du Champs de Mars with the title
Brown and Gold, Potrait of Lady E. . . . Meanwhile Lord Eden had
sent Whistler a check for 100 guineas, which Whistler took as an insult
(although he cashed it). On -the return of the painting to his studio
after the exhibition, Whistler painted out Lady Eden's head, painted in
another, and refused to deliver the painting to Lord Eden, who sued to
require restoration of the portrait, delivery, and damages. The trial
court held for Eden on all counts,3 but in the court of appeal that part of
judgment ordering restoration and delivery was reversed. Lord Eden
was entitled to restitution of the 100 guineas he had paid and damages
for breach of contract, but he could not compel restoration of the
portrait or its delivery. The Cour de Cassation agreed.4
2. See Guille v. Colmant, [1967] Recueil Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 284, [1967]
Gazette du Palais [Gaz. Pal.] I. 17 (Cour d'appel, Paris). The trial court, the Tribunal
de grand instance de Pontoise, had held for Colmant on all points but was rather
thoroughly reversed by the court of appeal. The contract was an interesting one,
containing, in addition to the terms already described, the 'provision that the dealer would
select fifteen of the twenty paintings furnished each month and the five not kept would
be destroyed by the painter. The court of appeal, referring to the "conditions dracon-
iennes" of the contract, found it vitiated by them and therefore annulled it. The
conditions the court of appeal found objectionable included those requiring the artist to
sign some paintings with a pseudonym and to leave others unsigned; that requiring the
artist to destroy his own paintings; and those committing the artist to produce so many
paintings a month (twenty) for so long (ten years). In a note to the decision Avocat
Raymond Sarraute strongly disagreed with the court of appeal as to the last of these
points but agreed on the signature and destruction conditions. See [1967] Gaz. Pal. I.
18 (note by Sarraute).
3. The judgment of the Tribunal de la Seine of March 20, 1895 is set out in the
judgment of the court of appeals. See Whistler v. Eden, [1898] Recueil Priodique et
Critique [D.P.] II. 465 (Cour d'appel, Paris).
4. Eden v. Whistler, [1900] [D.P.] I. 497, [19001 Recueil Sirey [S. Jur.] I. 490
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These three decisions illustrate three principal components of "the
moral right of the artist," a right that has had its major development in
France but that is a part of the law of most European and some Latin
American nations. The moral right of the artist is usually classified in
civil law doctrine as a right of personality,5 and in particular is distin-
guished from patrimonial or property rights. Copyright, for example,
which is available to artists in civil law countries as well as in the United
States and other common law countries, is a patrimonial or property
right which protects the artist's pecuniary interest in the work of art. The
moral right, on the contrary, is one of a small group of rights intended
to recognize and protect the individual's personality. Rights of person-
ality include the rights to one's identity, to a name, to one's reputation,
one's occupation or profession, to the integrity of one's person, and to
privacy.6
(Cass. civ.). Both the court of appeal and the Cour de Cassation also forbade Whistler
to dispose of the painting or show it until all those aspects of it attributable to or
representing Lady Eden's image were removed from it.
The Whistler decision is generally thought to be an important advance in French
law over the position taken by the Cour de Paris in Bonheur v. Pourchet, 11865] D.P. II.
201, [1865] S. Jur. II. 233 (Cour imp6riale, Paris). There the painter Rosa Bonheur
had accepted a commission from Pourchet but had never painted the work and eventually
told Pourchet that she would not do so. He sued to compel performance, and the civil
tribunal of Fontainebleau ordered her to provide the painting within six months or pay a
daily fine, a peculiar French remedy called astreinte. The Cour de Paris reversed,
holding that the painter could not be compelled to perform. However, it awarded
exemplary damages of 4,000 francs for breach of contract. There was no claim that the
artist was refusing to deliver a completed work. There was no mention of the artist's
moral right in the opinion or in the anonymous note to it in the report. The notion of a
special right of the artist both not to declare complete and not to deliver an apparently
completed commissioned work, as part of a larger moral right of divulgation, thus ap-
peared after 1865. See text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
5. There is a persistent minority doctrinal position that treats the artist's moral
right as an additional property right, rather than a right of personality. However the
dominant view is to the contrary. For an authoritative discussion see Waline, Le Droit
moral de l'artiste sur son oeuvre et le droit public, [1936] D.P. III. 57.
6. For general discussions of rights of personality in European law see H.
HuBMANN, DAS PERS6NLICHKErTSRECHT (2d ed. 1967); Kayser, Les droits de la personal-
iti, 69 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 445 (1971).
One point that is still argued in Italy and France is whether there is a general
category of rights of personality or merely a group of specific rights that are so classified
for convenience. Germany appears definitely to have adopted the general category
position, and France and Italy are moving in that direction. The difference has practical
consequences, as a case involving the artist Giorgio De Chirico shows. See text
accompanying notes 27-31 infra.
Both the German Constitution and the European Declaration of Human Rights
extend guarantees to personality and can thus be seen as elevating rights of personality to
the level of constitutionally protected fundamental rights. See, e.g., WEST GERMAN
GRuNDoESETZ art. I; Judgment of May 25, 1954, 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesrichtshofs
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It is interesting to note that the moral right of the artist in French
law is entirely judicial in origin.7  This is in itself remarkable, since one
of the most treasured tenets of the conventional wisdom about the civil
law is that law is made by legislators and executives, not by judges. The
development of the moral right of the artist is merely another example of
the extent to which this tattered brocard is inapplicable to France.8
Although judicial in origin, the moral right of the artist has been put
into statutory form in France and in many other civil law nations, and is
regularly included in international conventions on the topic of copyright
and related rights of authors and artists.' Like other statutory rights, it
continues to grow and develop through judicial interpretation and appli-
cation, and it is probably accurate to say that the moral right of the
artist, still comparatively young even in the nation of its origin, has not
reached anything like its full development.
in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 334. It can also be argued that a similar status for rights of
personality can be deduced from articles 2 and 22 of the Italian Constitution.
7. For the most thorough treatment of the moral right in French law see H.
DESBois, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR EN FRANCE 421-545 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
Dassois].
8. I have tried to show elsewhere that it is equally invalid for other parts of the
civil law world. See J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION, 20-49, 86-91 & passim
(1968).
9. See, e.g., Law of Mar. 11, 1957, No. 57-296, art. 6 (France); Law of Sept. 9,
1965, arts. 11-14 (Germany); Law of Apr. 22, 1941, No. 633, as amended, Law of Aug.
23, 1946, arts. 20-24 (Italy), reprinted in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF
THE WORLD (1974) (hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT LAws). In addition the Italian
Civil Code provides: "The author has the exclusive right to publish the work and to
exploit it financially in any form or manner. . . . Even after the assignment of [such]
rights. . . the author can sue to confirm his authorship of the work and bring an action
to object to any deformation, mutilation, or other modification of such work that can
prejudice his honor or reputation." M. BELTRAMO, G. LONGO & J. MERRYMAN, THE
ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 2577, at 645 (emphasis added).
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted
by more than fifty nations, includes in article 6-bis language identical to that of article
2577 of the Italian Civil Code. The United States has never acceded to the Berne
Convention, although it is a party to the Universal Copyright Convention (which
includes no moral right protection). Professor Nimmer states that resistance to the
moral right provision by United States "user groups"'-primarily the motion picture and
television interests-is one reason for United States abstention from Berne accession. See
Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the
United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 524 (1967). For a thorough
discussion of the moral right objection to Berne accession see id. at 518-25, 547-54.
The tendency to lump all "arts"--performing, literary, and visual-into one catego-
ry occasionally conceals significant differences. Here the resistance of an extremely
important sector of the performing arts world (motion pictures and television) to moral
right helps prohibit its availability to visual artists, who are engaged in activities that are
normally of only marginal interest to the motion picture and television industries.
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The moral right of the artist is actually a composite right. The
Buffet"0 case involved one of the components: the right of integrity (of
the work of art), also sometimes called the right to respect of the work.
The notion is that the work of art is an expression of the artist's
personality. Distortion, dismemberment or misrepresentation of the
work mistreats an expression of the artist's personality, affects his artistic
identity, personality, and honor, and thus impairs a legally protected
personality interest. To treat one of the six panels of the refrigerator-
painting as a separate work distorted and misrepresented the artist's
intention. The owner of the refrigerator could keep and enjoy it. He
could dispose of the entire painting. He was not permitted to take it
apart and dispose of it piece by piece.
The Guille" case involved a second component of the moral right,
the right of paternity. 2 This is the right of the artist to insist that his
work be associated with his name. In France and in some other nations
the artist cannot waive this right, so that, as in the Guille case, the artist
can insist that his paintings be attributed to him even though he has
contracted to the contrary. 13 The artist can also insist that his name not
be associated with works that are not his creation.
14
10. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
11. See note 2 & accompanying text supra.
12. The right of paternity was also at issue in Carco v. Camoin, [1931] D.P. II.
88 (Cour d'appel, Paris) (note by Nast) and Guino v. Consorts Renoir, [1971] La
Semaine Juridique [J.C.P.] II. No. 16697, [1971] Gaz. Pal. I. 235, digested in [1971]
D.S. Jur. 174 (Tribunal de la grande instance de Paris). Since the present article
focuses on the right of integrity these decisions are not further discussed here.
13. For a discussion of the inalienability of the moral right under French and
Italian law see notes 75-76 & accompanying text infra.
14. No cases on this point have been found, but the conclusion seems in principle
undebatable. The question might have arisen in the Millet case, Millet, Judgment of
May 20, 1911, [1911] Amm. I. 271 (Tribunal de la Seine), if the parties, their counsel,
or the court had so wished, but as the case actually proceeded the point seems to have
been left out of consideration. See note 19 & accompanying text infra. In Bernard-
Rosseau v. Soc. des Galaries Lafayette, Judgment of Mar. 13, 1973 summarized in
[1974] 48 J.C.P. 224 (Tribunal de la grande instance, Paris), the question could not
arise because the artist's name was omitted entirely from the works in question.
However, it is significant that the court thought the offense to the right of integrity
would have been more serious if the artist's name had been used in connection with the
disputed reproductions. See note 22 & accompanying text infra.
A potentially difficult problem is raised by the accidental damage cases. Can an
artist claim that a seriously damaged painting or sculpture is no longer his work and have
it suppressed? Does it make a difference that the damage is accidental when, so far as
the public is concerned, the appearance is the same as it would be had the change in the
work been deliberately made? If we are to distinguish between deliberate and accidental
alterations of the work must we also distinguish between those accidental effects that are
attributable to negligence and those that are innocent? It is enough in any case to give
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The Whistler'5 case is an example of the artist's right to withhold
the work, sometimes referred to as the right of divulgation. This
component of the moral right gives the artist the absolute right to decide
when (and whether) a work of art is complete, and when (and wheth-
er) to show it to the public. Even though knowledgeable third persons
might conclude that a work of art is for all practical purposes complete,
and even if their judgment is supported by the artist's conduct with
respect to the work, the artist still can insist that the work not be shown
or treated as complete.' 8
In addition to these three components (the right of integrity, the
right of paternity, and the right of divulgation) French commentators
usually mention other interests commonly treated as aspects of the more
general moral right. Of these the "right to repent or to retake" is the
most important and consists of the right of the artist to withdraw the
work from its owner on payment of an indemnity.'7 Related to this
right, and sometimes treated as an aspect of it, is the "right of modifica-
tion.'1 8  These rights are usually considered primarily applicable to
literary works, although their potential utility in connection with works
of visual art is apparent.
the artist the right to insist on restoration, and if so at whose expense? What if the
artist believes true restoration is not possible? Would something like the "right to repent
or to retake" suffice to protect the artist's interest in such cases? See note 17 &
accompanying text infra. These and many other questions that will quickly occur to the
reader call for clarification if a right of integrity is to be included in American law.
15. See notes 3-4 & accompanying text supra.
16. There has been a good deal of litigation on the right of divulgation because of
the consequence of the distinction between a completed (or divulged) and incomplete (or
not divulged) work. In Bowers v. Bonnard, [1952] D. Jur. 390 (note by Desbois),
[1951] Gaz. Pal. II. 290 (Tribunal civil de Ia Seine), the question was what works
would be community property. In Martinez-Picabia v. Dame Mahler-Picabia, [1970]
J.C.P. IV. 154, [1970] 63 Revue Internationale Du Droit D'Auteur [R.I.D.A.] 191
(Cour d'appel, Paris), [1971] J.C.P. II. 17164 (Cass. civ.), it was the same, complicated
by the inheritance claims of children of an earlier marriage. In the two Rouault cases
the dispute was between the painter (and his heirs) and the heirs of his dealer, Ambroise
Vollard over ownership. See P. v. Rouault, [1965] J.C.P. II. No. 14186, [1965] Gaz.
Pal. II. 45 (Cour d'appel, Orleans); Rouault v. Consorts Vollard, [1947] S. Jur. 11. 3
(note by Desbois), [1947] J.C.P. II. No. 3405 (Tribunal civil de la Seine) (note by
Plaisant). It is paradoxical that the right of divulgation, which is a component of the
nonpatrimonial moral right, should be crucial to the decision of such thoroughly
patrimonial lawsuits.
The right of divulgation was also the basis for the decision in Leroux v. Damiano,
[1966] D.S. Jur. 166 (Cour d'appel, Aix-en-Provence) (note by Savatier) (voiding a
contract requiring the artist, a painter, to maintain a certain rhythm of production); cf.
Guille v. Colmant, [1967] D.S. Jur. 284, [1967] Gaz. Pal. I. 17 (Cour d'appel, Paris).
See note 2 supra.
17. See DESBOIS, supra note 7, at 435.
18. See id. at 445.
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The Right of Integrity
Although these components have a common basis in the notion of
moral right, and are therefore in a certain sense inseparable, I do not
propose to attempt a full discussion of them here. Instead I will focus
on the right of integrity of the work of art. A closer look at the way the
right of integrity has taken form in decisions of French and Italian
courts exposes a number of fascinating questions about the social value
of works of art and artists. Such questions are decided quite differently
in the United States than in Western Europe and Latin America, and
this observation provides the basis for some speculation about the
position of art and artists in this country. First a look at one Italian,
one German, and some French decisions.
Charles Millet, a son of the nineteenth century painter J. F. Millet,
intervened in a suit between two publishers over which had the right to
publish a reproduction of Millet's popular painting The Angelus. Mil-
let claimed that both publishers' versions distorted and falsified his
father's work and that, on the basis of the moral right, their publication
should be prohibited. The court so held, stating that the reproductions
brightened the light in the painting, made objects look real and vulgar,
added a bonnet on one person's head and a scarf around a woman's
neck, and changed an evening scene to one suffused by a glaring
noonday sun. No one looking at such a "reproduction" could have
believed that Millet was a great artist. The court spoke fervently of the
"superior interests of human genius" which dictated that the work of art
be "protected and kept as it emerged from the imagination of its author
and later conveyed to posterity without damage from the acts of individ-
uals with dubious intentions guided by some transient fashion or profit
motives."' 9
In 1948 a French theater commissioned Fernand L6ger to design
stage settings for the opera Bolivar with music by Darius Milhaud.
L~ger worked on the commission for a year and the opera premiered in
1950. In 1952 it was again produced, but with scene 3 of act 2, "The
Crossing of the Andes," excised. Lager brought an action against the
19. Millet, Judgment of May 20, 1911, [1911] Amm. I. 271 (Tribunal de la
Seine). One of the publishers unsuccessfully argued that Millet's fame was so secure
that nothing could mar his reputation and, further, that the original is in the Louvre,
where those who wished could see the true colors, tones, and lighting.
Millet had requested one franc in damages, prohibition (astreinte) of publication or
distribution of either reproduction, and destruction of those already printed. The court
awarded the damages and the astreinte (at a fine of twenty francs per copy) but found it
had no power to require destruction of existing copies.
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theater, arguing that suppression of the setting for part of the opera
without his consent impaired his moral right. He asked for damages
and an order that the defendant reestablish the opera's stage setting in
its entirety. The court agreed that the stage design constituted a work
of art to which the moral right attached but said that other rights were
also involved. The composer of the opera and its producer had rights,
including the right to control the production. Still, the court held that
the producer had no right to make a cut both without the artist's
permission and without informing the public. It ordered that all adver-
tising for any future performance of the opera include a statement that
the stage settings were by Lger and that the setting for "The Crossing
of the Andes" was not shown because of the removal of that scene from
the production.20
In 1971, the Galeries Lafayette, a Paris department store, used
reproductions of works by the painter Henri Rousseau in its window
decorations. A granddaughter of the artist sued on counterfeiting,
copyright, and moral right grounds, seeking repression of the reproduc-
tions and damages.2 The court had no difficulty in finding that the
reproductions, which employed different colors and altered images,
violated the right of integrity.
22
20. See Ldger v. Reunion des Theatres Lyriques Nationaux, [1955] 6 R.I.D.A. 146
(Tribunal civil de ]a Seine) 146. Lager had also argued that the opera was a complex
work of which, as designer, he was coauthor and thus entitled to participate in
production decisions. The court dismissed this claim, saying that the opera was
essentially libretto plus music which could be recorded or radio-broadcast, and that the
scenery and costumes were ancillary.
21. Unlike copyright, which is for a limited time (life of the artist plus fifty years
in most of the world), moral right is generally viewed as perpetual in duration. Hence
the possibility of legal action with respect to the work of artists long dead. The
durability of the right raises special questions of succession because of its non-property
classification as a right of personality. Accordingly, some of the moral right statutes
include specific provisions on succession. See note 9 supra. For example, article 23 of
the Italian statute provides: "After the death of the author, the right .. . may be
asserted, without limitation of time, by the spouse and children and, in the absence
thereof, by the parents and other direct ascendants and descendants; in the absence of
such ascendants and descendants, by brothers and sisters and their descendants. If the
public interest should so require, such action may also be taken by the Minister for
Public Culture ...... See COPYRIGHT LAWS, supra note 9.
Germany is a prominent exception to the rule that the moral right is perpetual. See
note 69 infra. The Berne Convention, article 6-bis (2), provides that in each member
nation the moral right shall endure at least as long as the copyright period of life plus
fifty years.
22. See Bernard-Rousseau v. Soc. des Galeries Lafayette, Judgment of Mar. 13,
1973 summarized in [1974] 48 J.C.P. 224 (Tribunal de la grande instance, Paris 3e).
The unpublished opinion contains a curious twist. The plaintiff had also complained
that the reproductions failed to bear the artist's name, so that two components of the
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The painter Bergerot contracted to sell all of his production to a
dealer at the rate of eight oils and ten gouaches per month, and the
dealer agreed to pay Bergerot a monthly salary of 1,200 francs, later
increased to 1,800 and then to 2,500. At first all went well. As a
result of the dealer's activity the painter's fame and his works' market
value grew very rapidly.23 Eventually the painter and the dealer fell out
and the painter sued the dealer and collected damages. This infuriated
the dealer, who decided to destroy the painter's fame as quickly as he
had created it. He published advertisements offering paintings by
Bergerot at low prices and dumped the painter's works into auctions by
the bundle. As a result the price dropped drastically.
The painter brought an action to restrain such acts and argued, as
one basis of recovery, that this dumping of paintings by the dealer
violated the artist's moral right because it led to a loss of respect for the
name and the work of the artist. The trial court seemed to agree, but
the Cour de Cassation quashed the judgment. 25 The basic problem was
that the right Bergerot was seeking to protect was seen not as a right of
personality but as a pecuniary interest; he was complaining about the
decrease in market value of his work brought about by the dealer's
marketing methods. The court distinguished that kind of inquiry from
an attack on the integrity of the work or on the artist's personality.20
moral right, the rights of integrity and paternity, were violated. The court agreed but
pointed out that the damage to the artist's reputation was actually reduced by omission of
his name on the reproductions; adding identification would have made matters worse by
informing those who might not otherwise have known that Rousseau was the artist.
23. According to the facts related by Advocate General Lindon, the dealer,
Martin-Caille, increased the market price of Bergerot's works by a variety of questiona-
ble means the advocate general said were not unusual in the trade in France. For
example, the dealer made gifts of Bergerot paintings to critics (he had Bergerot paint
them specially and urged him merely to paint copies in order to spend as little time as
possible-no more than one hour each-on them) and reminded the donees that they
had the power to increase the value of the gifts by their "criticism." See Martin-Caille
v. Bergerot, [1969] D.S. Jur. 73 (Cass. civ. Ire.).
24. At one subsequent auction several Bergerot paintings failed to reach the
reserve price and those placed without reserve received very low prices. The only
Bergerot receiving a high price was one consigned by the painter himself and artificially
bid up by friends and relations in a futile attempt to maintain the market. Id.
25. See id. There was no problem about damages, which had been awarded and
paid. The difficulty was with that portion of the trial court judgment which, on moral
right grounds, required Martin-Calle to submit any proposed disposition of the 164
paintings he still owned to approval by an appointed expert who would insure that they
were not the instruments of a further attack on Bergerot's market.
26. It should be added that the Cour de Cassation was troubled by the interference
in the right of property necessarily implied in the trial court's judgment. To award
damages for the dealers' acts was one thing; to apply direct restraints to his disposition of
paintings that he owned was another. This concern helped persuade the court to
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The distinction seems basically sound, particularly in the context of
Bergerot, but it can be pushed too hard. At any given time there is
bound to be a relation between the critical or historical estimate of an
artist's work and the market price of his paintings or sculpture. Indeed,
the common assumption is that prevailing critical and historical judg-
ments determine the market by their influence on the decisions of buyers
and sellers. Can that proposition be reversed? It would seem so. The
public can reasonably assume that the market reflects the opinion of art
critics and historians and the purchasing preferences of collectors, mu-
seum curators, and acquisition committees. If that is so, then a deliber-
ate campaign to depress the market prices of an artist's work could
reflect on the public estimation of the artist himself.
In 1950 the Venice Biennale, which customarily arranged an im-
portant one-man show to run concurrently with the exhibitions at the
national pavilions that were the Biennale's feature, drew together works
by the Italian artist Giorgio De Chirico from public and private collec-
tions for a retrospective exhibition. None of the paintings belonged to
the artist, but he brought an action to prohibit the exhibition. His
principal argument was that the show misrepresented him by overin-
cluding his earlier paintings and underincluding the later ones. In fact
art historians, critics, and the public generally consider the early paint-
ings his major artistic contribution. The artist, however, considers his
later work a continuing series of important artistic developments, and he
places a very high value on later paintings and devalues the earlier ones.
The dispute with the Venice Biennale was, accordingly, merely another
episode in a continuing disagreement between the artist and the art
world. The trial court accepted the artist's claim.17  It observed that
the one-man show at the Biennale was a very important one, that it
would be viewed as a critical and representative exhibition of the artist's
work, that it would strongly affect the public estimation of the artist,
and that accordingly the artist had a legally protectable interest in being
accurately and fairly represented in it.28 At some points in the decision
construe the statutory moral right provisions (Law of Mar. 11, 1956, No. 57-296, art. 6
reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAws, supra note 9) narrowly in order to avoid the conflict.
27. See De Chirico v. Ente Autonomo "La Biennale" di Venezia, [1951] Diritto
de Autori 220, [1951] Temi 568, [1952] 50 Rivista Diritto Commerciale [Riv. Dir.
Comm.] II. 128 (Tribunal di Venezia) (note by Fioretta).
28. Although no other case on this point has been found, article 9 of the Spanish
Ley de la Propiedad Intelectual of January 10, 1879, cited in the opinion of the court of
appeal, provides that "[tihe transfer of a work of art does not constitute a transfer . . .
of the right of public exposition of the work . . . unless there is agreement to the
contrary." Mr. De Chirico was, in effect, arguing for a similar rule under Italian law.
[Vol. 27
May 1976] THE REFRIGERATOR OF BERNARD BUFFET
the court seemed almost to say that such an exhibition could not be held
without the artist's prior consent. At the least it said that it would listen
sympathetically to a claim by the artist that such a show seriously
misrepresented his work.
The Court of Appeal of Venice, however, disagreed. 29  Unfortu-
nately, it did not really deal with De Chirico's argument. Instead the
court treated the moral right as though it were a purely statutory
creation (as in fact it is in Italy, though not in France), read the
statute3" narrowly and literally, and found that it provided no right in
the artist to control the exhibition of works he no longer owned. 31  To
the court the artist's remedy was through private agreement at the time
of sale of the painting. One cannot help wishing that the court had
reached the issue. It seems undeniable that an exhibition can be
stacked, whether deliberately or not, so as to misrepresent the artist's
work. This could adversely affect the artist's reputation and thus
arguably impair his moral right. But to ask a court to intervene is to
suggest something close to, if not indistinguishable from, censorship.
Just as one would be reluctant to suggest judicial suppression or "edit-
ing" of a book that, in the selection of paintings illustrated and in the
text, misrepresented a painter's work, so one ought to avoid similar
suppression or "editing" of an exhibition. Yet if one agrees with this
argument, how is it possible to support a right of integrity at all? Is
there a convenient line to be drawn between the kinds of mistreatment
of the artist's work that ought to be legally prevented and other kinds for
which, in order to protect freedom of expression or other overriding
social interests, no such legal remedy is available? The instinctive
response is that there is such a line, at least in the sense that most cases
fall clearly into one or the other category, but experience leads us to
29. See Ente Autonomo "La Biennale" di Venezia v. De Chirico, [1955] Foro
Italiano [Foro Ital.] I. 717 (Corte de appello di Venezia) (note by Rava).
30. C. Civ. art. 2577 (Giuffr6 1965); Law of Apr. 22, 1941, No. 633, arts. 20-24,
reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAws, supra note 9.
31. In one sense the decision of the court of appeal is a rejection of the notion of a
general right of personality in favor of the position that there are only specific rights. See
note 6 supra. Hence its holding that the statute is the exclusive source of moral right
and its narrow interpretation of its terms. This approach seems particularly striking in
view of language in the ministerial report introducing the bill that became the Law of
April 22, 1941, No. 633, which would seem to argue for a more generous interpretation,
including the following: "Mhe artist lives in the work of art, and in the work of art he
finds support of his honor, his reputation, his spiritual existence, his life . . . ." In his
note on the case Professor Rava calls the court's reasoning "a strictly exegetic interpreta-
tion of the terms of the statute . . . ." See [1955] Foro Ital. I. 717 (note by Rava).
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expect that there will be difficult cases, just as there are difficult cases
wherever legal lines must be drawn. 2
A painter, Lacasse, was commissioned to paint frescoes in a chapel
in a small French town. The commission was awarded and the work
carried out without the knowledge of the bishop, the owner of the
chapel. Eventually, the bishop heard that the frescoes had been done
and that there was criticism of them. He inspected them and found
them of dubious taste, decided that even modification would not make
them acceptable, and ordered them effaced. The artist objected, and
litigation ensued. The court found the case to involve a conflict be-
tween the right of the artist and the right of ownership and, in this case,
found in favor or the owner. Accordingly there was no liability for
effacement of the frescoes."3
Two years later, however, another action arose involving distruc-
tion of a work of art. In this case the sculptor Sudre had been asked to
decorate a public fountain in his native village and had done so by
creating a statue of a woman wearing the local costume. Apparently
the sculpture was not properly maintained, and finally the city council
decided, without a serious attempt at restoration, to have the sculpture
removed and destroyed. On a visit to the village Sudre found the pieces
of his broken statue used to fill holes in the road. He brought an action
against the city council and was awarded substantial damages. The
court found that the destruction violated the artist's moral right of
integrity of the work of art.
34
The Lacasse and Sudre cases appear to arrive at inconsistent re-
sults, but it should be noted -that in Lacasse the paintings were executed
without the consent of the church's owner. It is not clear that, had the
bishop given prior consent to the execution of the frescoes, he would
have been allowed to efface them against the artist's objection .3  An-
32. As the court of appeal suggested, the artist could sell the work subject to the
restriction that it not be exhibited without his consent. In Spain the problem has been
anticipated by the statutory provision that the transfer of a work of art does not transfer
the right of public exposition in the absence of a contrary agreement. See note 28
supra. The effect of such a statute is to transfer the onus of procuring the other party's
assent from the artist to the purchaser. One advantage of such a statute is to remove
much of the reason for an action like that in De Chirico, and thus to make this kind of
line-drawing problem more academic than real.
33. See Lacasse et Welcome v. Abb6 Qu6nard, [1934] Recueil Hebdomadaire de
Jurisprudence [D.H. Jur.] 385, [1934] Gaz. Pal. II. 165 (Cour d'appel, Paris) (unsigned
note).
34. See Sudre v. Commune de Baixas, [1936] D.P. III. 57 (Conseil d'Etat) (note
by Waline).
35. Professor Waline's note in the report of the decision of the Conseil d'Etat
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other distinction is that in Sudre not only was the statue destroyed, but
the pieces of it were used to repair the road. Had the statue's remnants
been disposed of in some less public and degrading way, the result
might conceivably have been different.36
It is interesting to note that the total destruction cases present a
question that has not yet been clearly resolved in any jurisdiction in
which the moral right exists: Does the total destruction of a work of art,
as distinguished from its distortion or mutilation, violate the artist's
moral fight? One instinctively assumes that destruction is worse than
mere damage-particularly if the damage is reparable-but the opposite
may be true. A damaged or altered painting continues to exist and, in
its imperfect form, to misrepresent the artist's work. Destruction is
sometimes less serious. For example, when the artist's production is
very large and the piece destroyed not an outstanding example of his
work, the loss to his reputation and honor may be insignificant. But
when the work to part of a small total artistic production, or is one of
only a few examples of that period in the artist's work, or is an example
of his most highly regarded work-perhaps his masterpeice-then it
seems clear that the interests protected by the moral right are impaired
by destruction.
On balance the argument that destruction violates the fight of
integrity seems persuasive. It is supported by analogy to the case of the
publisher who buys an author's manuscript and then destroys it or
merely refuses to publish it or allow others to do so; a remedy based on
the moral right is available to the author in such a case under French
law.3 7 Even more significant is the argument that destruction nullifies
other rights of the artist, including rights that are in some nations
perpetual and inalienable (such as the right of paternity) as well as
more limited rights (such as the right of reproduction and the droit de
suite) ordinarily retained by the artist.3 8
How would a United States court have decided these "right of
integrity" cases? It is likely that all would have gone against the artist.
The moral right of the artist, and in particular that component called the
distinguishes the cases on this basis, as does an unsigned note to the decision on remand.
See Sudre v. Commune de Baixas, [1937] Gaz. Pal. I. 347 (Conseil de Prefecture de
Montpellier).
36. For a development of this point see F. Maurice, The Moral Right under
French Law, June 1974 (unpublished paper in author's file).
37. See Wormser v. Lion, [1917] D.H. Jur. 545 (Cour d'appel, Paris).
38. For discussion of this point see Ente Autonomo "La Biennale" di Venezia v.
De Chirico, [1955] Foro Ital. I. 717 (Corte de appello di Venezia).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
right of integrity of the work of art, simply does not exist in our law."
Indeed, this proposition is so clear that there are few recorded instances
in which artists have attempted to seek judicial protection of interests
analogous to those of the moral right of the artist. One outstanding
exception is the case of the Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church,40 in
which Crimi had been commissioned to do frescoes in a church, had
executed the commission, and had been paid. Some years later criti-
cism developed within the church's congregation, and eventually the
frescoes were obliterated. Basing his claim in part on the moral right of
the artist, Crimi brought an action to compel the congregation to have
the frescoes restored or removed 'and to pay damages. The court denied
the remedy and, in doing so, explicitly stated that the moral right of the
artist did not exist under New York law or, so far as it could find,
elsewhere in the United States.4 ' If Crimi wished to retain such rights
he would have to do so by contract. 2 It was also held in Vargas v.
Esquire, Inc.," that the right of paternity, and indeed the entire notion
of the moral right of the artist, does not exist in the United States. 4  A
39. For discussions of the moral right in American law see J. WHICHER, THE
CREATIVE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 8-32 (1965); W. STRAUSS, THE MORAL RIGHT
OF THE AUTHOR, in STUDIES PREPARED FOR SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 109
(Comm. Print 1960) (hereinafter cited as STRAUSS I); Katz, The Doctrine of Moral
Right and American Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REv. 375 (1951);
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. Rav. 554 (1940); Stevenson, Moral Right and the Common Law:
A Proposal, ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAw SYMPOsIuM No. 6, at 89 (1955); Strauss, The
Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. 506 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Strauss
II); Treece, American Law Analogies of the Author's "Moral right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L.
487 (1968); Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through
Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539 (1972); Note, The
Doctrine of Droit Moral: Its Place in American Copyright Law, 16 How. L.J. 539
(1971); Note, Protection of the Artist and Sculptor Under the Law of Copyright, 22 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 709 (1961); S. Berke, The Moral Right of the Artist in the United States
and the Proposed Copyright Revision, May 1974 (unpublished paper in author's file).
40. 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
41. "Thus, the claim of this plaintiff that an artist retains rights in his work after
it has been unconditionally sold where such rights are related to the protection of his
artistic reputation, is not supported by the decisions of our courts." Id. at 576, 89
N.Y.S.2d at 819.
42. The court also held that even if the artist had by express agreement retained
the right claimed against the church it would have to have been in writing to be
enforceable under the New York Real Property Law, since the fresco was part of the
wall of the'church building and thus part of the real estate. See id.
43. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
44. Vargas was found to have sold certain drawings and the right to use his name
(or not use it) to Esquire Magazine. He complained that Esquire published the
drawings without his name. In deciding against the artist the court stated: "Plaintiff
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right to withhold the work of art, although not necessarily identical to
that exemplified in the Whistler case,4 5 does, however, exist in our law
as a component of the common law copyright.46
The basic position in the United States can be summarized in this
form: A work of art is like any other object of property for, legal
purposes, except as modified by the copyright law, and the copyright
law protects only property rights. The position in France and other
civil law countries is, on the contrary, that a work of art is different for
some legal purposes from other objects of property, so that the law of
property must be appropriately modified in order to deal properly with
the special considerations that are raised by works of art.47
There is a curious aspect to some of the legal periodical literature
on moral right in the United States. Beginning with the 1955 article by
William Strauss 48 one finds both an effort to depreciate the actual extent
of protection provided by the right in civil law countries and an earnest
attempt to find functional equivalents-remedies that "amount to the
same thing"-in our law.49  Thus breach of implied agreement, unfair
advances another theory which needs little discussion. It is predicated upon the
contention that there is a distinction between the economic rights of an author capable of
assignment and what are called 'moral rights' of the author, said to be those necessary
for the protection of his honor and integrity. These so-called 'moral rights,' so we are
informed, are recognized by the civil law of certain foreign countries .... What
plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law in this country to conform to that of
certain other countries. We need not stop to inquire whether such a change, if desirable,
is a matter for the legislative or judicial branch of the government; in any event, we are
not disposed to make any new law in this respect." Id. at 526.
45. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
46. One reason is that the common law copyright, which is lost by publication,
should not be lost through publication without the artist's consent. For a discussion of
the right to withhold publication see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 46-59 (1975).
47. If, as I believe, there is a strong and probably irreversible trend in the United
States toward special legal treatment for works of art and artists, then the matter of legal
differentiation becomes important. What shall be considered a work of art and who an
artist for the purpose of the right of integrity, for example? That question, which is
merely one variation of the more general line-drawing problem in the law, is both
inevitable and, in an ultimate sense, insoluble. The best working definitions still dispose
of only the majority of cases, and it is seldom difficult to find or imagine examples of
their inadequacy. However, this is a road we have already begun to travel-for example,
works of art are imported free of duty, so it becomes necessary to distinguish those
objects which are duty-free from those which are not. See Derenberg & Baum, Congress
Rehabilitates Modern Art, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1228 (1959). There is no indication in the
decisions or doctrine that the distinction has created unusual difficulties in France,
Germany, or Italy.
48. See Strauss HI, supra note 39.
49. See, e.g., J. WmcHER, THE CRnTrVE ARTS Am THE JUDiciAL PnocEss 8-32
(1965); STRAuss I, supra note 39; Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the
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competition, libel, and other relatively flexible legal categories are
shown to be expandable to include something like the moral right. This
posture has been adopted in the context of revision of the Copyright
Act5" and undoubtedly contributes to the disinclination to provide expli-
citly for protection of the moral right in the draft revision.51
Both aspects of this position inaccurately state the law. Consider,
for example, the total destruction cases. It is not correct either to
equate Crimi52 to Lacasse53 or to ignore Sudre.54  To do so misrepre-
sents the French position.55 The artist created the frescoes in Crimi at
the request of the owners of the church; in Lacasse the owner of the
church neither requested nor assented to the creation of the mural.
Sudre, a later French decision than Lacasse, which did not involve the
problem of consent of the owner of the site of the work, held for the
artist and is a better precedent for Crimi. It is true that, on comparable
facts, a German court has stated, in dictum, that the owner of a house
could, without legal liability, totally paint out a mural against the artist's
protest.5 It is also true, however, that an Italian court, again in dictum,
stated that the right of integrity protects against destruction of the
artist's work. Thus the European position on destruction tilts in favor
of an aspect of the moral right explicitly claimed by the artist and
Law of Artist, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554 (1940); Strauss II, supra
note 39; Treece, American Law Analogies of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J.
COMP. L. 487 (1968); Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right
Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEo. L.J. 1539 (1972).
50. The article by Strauss was prepared for the United States Senate Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright for use by it in considering proposals for
copyright law revision. See STRAuss I, supra note 39.
51. The Strauss article, basically a revision of an earlier article, is particularly
influential in this context. See id.; cf. S. Berke, The Moral Right of the Artist in
the United States and the Proposed Copyright Revision, May 1974 (unpublished paper in
author's file).
52. See notes 40-42 & accompanying text supra.
53. See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
54. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
55. The court in Crimi refers to Lacasse without noting the factual difference.
Strauss refers to Lacasse with approval, noting the factual distinction but treating it as
insignificant. See SRAuss I, supra note 39, at 134-35. Neither mentions Sudre.
56. See Felseneiland mit Sirenen, Judgment of June 8, 1912, 79 Entscheidungen
des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 397. The owner of the house had commis-
sioned the mural and then, offended by nudity in it, had the offending figures
clothed by another painter. The artist claimed that this violated his moral right, and the
court agreed; the artist's work could not be altered without his consent. Although the
question was not at issue, the court also briefly considered the alternative of totally
effacing the mural and reached the conclusion stated in the text.
57. See Ente Autonomo "La Biennale" di Venezia v. De Chirico, [1955] Foro
Ital. I. 717 (Corte de appello di Venezia).
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explicitly denied by the court in the only reported58 American case in
point.
Crimi is one of the few American decisions addressing the moral
right question,"9 and its response is unequivocal: there is no moral right.
The Vargas opinion, cited and quoted with approval by the Crimi
court on the moral right question, stated the same view. In a music
case, Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,60 the court
found no violation of the composer's claimed moral right, while, on
identical facts, a French court found a violation. 61 There is no basis in
any reported litigation involving claims of moral right, or functional
equivalents of it, to assume that an American court would have enjoined
auction of the Buffet panel or publication of one or the other Millet
reproduction, that it would have required published notice of the omis-
sion of one scene from the Lger stage settings, or that it would have
suppressed the Rousseau reproductions. An American court might
have awarded relief of the sort the French court granted in Bergerot,
62
since the real interest claimed was a pecuniary one, rather than a mere
personality interest.
At the bottom of it all is the significant fact that where the artist
claims a violation of a personality interest, rather than a patrimonial
interest, the civil law responds and our law does not. That is the real
difference.
The matter is far from academic. There has recently been a great
deal of publicity about the treatment of the estate of David Smith, an
58. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup.
Ct. 1949). A matter involving the sculptor David Smith is an unreported example of
one artist's futile attempt to find a legal remedy against alteration of his work. See notes
63-65 & accompanying text infra. Another American sculptor, Gabe Kohn, is said to
have been so enraged and frustrated by an alleged alteration of his work (cleaning off
accumulated grime, which he insisted it was part of his axtistic intention to let
accumulate) and the lack of a legal remedy that he left his dealer and New York.
Conversation with Albert E. Elsen, Walter Haas Professor of Art, Stanford University. It
seems likely that there are other unreported examples.
59. In Meliodon v. School Dist., 328 Pa. 457, 195 A. 905 (1938), there is no
discussion of moral right, perhaps because counsel for the plaintiff did not raise the issue.
The plaintiff, a sculptor, sought damages and an order of destruction of work that the
defendant had commissioned and subsequently altered without the artist's consent. Relief
was denied on technical grounds, but with tantalizing reference to an "adequate remedy
at law" that the court did not specify and that seemed in any case to be barred by
sovereign immunity. In any event, the artist lost.
60. 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), afrd, 275 App. Div. 692, 87
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
61. See Soc. Le Chant du Mond v. Soc., Fox Europe et Fox Am6ricaine Twentieth
Century, [1954] D. Jur. 16, 80 (Cour d'appel, Paris).
62. See notes 23-26 & accompanying text supra.
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influential American sculptor. According to published reports,63 the
art critic Clement Greenberg, an executor of Smith's estate, has stripped
the paint from some of the sculptures in the estate and has placed others
in exposed positions in order to encourage removal of paint by weather-
ing. It is true that unpainted David Smith sculptures are preferred by
collectors and museums and bring higher prices in the art market. It is
difficult to determine, however, the extent to which this market prefer-
ence is separable from Greenberg's own activity, since he is an influen-
tial critic who has had much to do with the acceptance of and high value
placed on David Smith's work and has consistently favored the unpainted
sculptures and depreciated the painted ones. Greenberg's action has
been described by some critics and experts as "an act of vandalism" and
as "an aesthetic crime." 64  There is evidence that Smith would have
objected; at one time he was enraged to learn that an owner of one of his
painted sculptures had altered it. He was further angered to find that
he had no legal remedy. In his frustration, he attempted to "disown"
the work and publicly made statements to that effect.65 But suppose
Smith had lived in France or Italy or Germany (or Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay or Venezuela 6 ); he would have been able
to compel restoration of the work (and probably could also have
received damages).
Who cares? What difference does it make to anyone that an
artist's work has been revised without his consent? It seems clear that
Smith, if he were still alive, would care. His heirs arguably might care
and would, in a civil law nation, have standing to object. There is no
indication in the published stories that Smith's heirs have attempted to
take corrective action, however, and it might be unreasonable to expect
them to do so. The unpainted sculptures have in the past brought
higher prices than the painted ones, so the heirs have at best conflicting
63. See Kramer, Questions Raised by Art Alterations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1974,
at 25, col. 1; Kramer, Altering of Smith Work Stirs Dispute, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1974,
at 28, col. 1; Krauss, Changing the Work of David Smith, ART IN AMERICA, Sept.-Oct.
1974, at 30; Richard, The Alteration of David Smith's Sculpture: An Esthetic Crime?,
Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1974, § H at 5, col. 1.
64. See Richard, The Alteration of David Smith's Sculpture: An Esthetic Crime?,
Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1974, § H at 5, col. 1.
65. For a recounting of the incident together with the text of letters Smith wrote
to Art News and Arts Magazine, see Krauss, Changing the Work of David Smith, ART
IN AMERICA, Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 30. In the letter to Arts Magazine, Smith wrote: "There
seems to be little legal protection for an artist in our country against vandalism or even
destruction. . . . Possibly we should start an action for protective laws." Id. at 33.
66. See R. Navarro, the Derecho Moral in Latin America, May 1973 (unpublished
paper in author's file).
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interests. Even if they have contemplated corrective action, they will
have found that our law provides them with very discouraging prospects
of success.
If the artist is dead and his heirs do not object, is there a problem?
Is it the purpose of the moral right to protect individual interests alone,
and if so what are those interests? If there is, in addition, a collective
social interest calling for protection, what is its nature? These are
interesting questions which deserve more thorough consideration than
they can be given here. At a minimum, however, it seems reasonable to
suggest the following:
1. On the level of individual interest there is more at stake than the
concern of the artist and his heirs for the integrity of his work. There is
also the interest of others in seeing, or preserving the opportunity to see,
the work as the artist intended it, undistorted and "unimproved" by the
unilateral actions of others, even those with the best intentions and the
most impressive credentials. We yearn for the authentic, for contact
with the work in its true version, and we resent and distrust anything
that misrepresents it.
6 7
2. The machinery of the state is available to protect "private" rights
in part because there is thought to be some general benefit in doing so.
Thus the interests of individual artists and viewers are only a part of the
story. Art is an aspect of our present culture and our history; it helps
tell us who we are and where we came from.6 8  To revise, censor, or
improve the work of art is to falsify a piece of the culture. We are
interested in protecting the work of art for public reasons, and the moral
right of the artist is in part a method of providing for private enforce-
ment of this public interest.
These truisms are to some extent supported by two related aspects
of the moral right that deserve additional comment. First is the rule in
many jurisdictions (Germany is a major exception) that the moral right
67. "My own view is that the paint Smith applied to the surfaces of these works
... is, at the very least, a faithful expression of Smith's desire to create a sculpture that
combined the resources of both color and construction. All evidence of that desire,
which so consumed the artist in his later years, has been obliterated with the sandblast-
ing or erosion of the painted surface. In a choice between Smith's partial realization of
his ambition and Mr. Greenberg's radical revision of it, one naturally wants the artist's
own version. Even an incomplete work by a great artist is pieferable to the revisions of
an alien hand." Kramer, Questions Raised by Art Alterations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,
1974, at 25, col. 2.
68. The text at this point paraphrases, with considerable loss of eloquence, a
position frequently advanced by Albert E. Elsen, Walter Haas Professor of Art, Stanford
University, in conversations with the writer.
is perpetual.69 Unlike the copyright, which eventually expires, the
moral right continues even -though the artist and his heirs have vanished.
This naturally leads to the provision of some alternative agent of en-
forcement, since a perpetual right with only temporary enforcement is
an anomaly. The establishment of a foundation or other legal person
for this purpose is an alternative that is permitted by French law 70 and
has been adopted by several French artists. The statutes of a number of
civil law nations also provide for enforcement of the moral right by a
public official, clearly in pursuance of a perceived public interest.7 '
Thus, by comparison with the situation in France, Germany, Italy,
and many other nations, our law concerning the integrity of the work of
art is underdeveloped. In its present state our law does not distinguish
rights of personality from patrimonial rights; our law provides no rem-
edy to the artist whose work has been distorted or destroyed; our law
provides no way to protect the public interest in preservation of our
culture against revision of works of art by unilateral unauthorized
action.
The underdeveloped state of our law on this topic is not surprising.
The moral right of the artist is a relatively recent growth in France,
where it has had its principal development. By the time the moral right
began to develop, French art had been of world importance for nearly a
century. By comparison, American art has achieved international rec-
ognition only in the last two decades; what has been rather lyrically
called "the triumph of American art" is a very recent phenomenon.
Legal change usually lags behind social and cultural change.
We are now at the opportune historical moment for consideration
of this question: Given the cultural importance of American art, should
our law be modified in such a way as to protect the integrity of works of
art? I believe that the answer to that question is clearly "yes." That
does not mean that we should attempt rote adoption of the civil law
69. For the doctrinal basis for the German decision to make the moral right
coextensive with the copyright, see A. DIETZ, DAs DROIT MORAL DES URHEBERS IM NEUEN
FRANZOSISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN URHEBERRECHT (1968); E. Marcus, The Moral Right of
the Artist in Germany, Dec. 1975 (unpublished paper in author's file).
70. See Law of Mar. 11, 1956, No. 57-296, art. 6, reprinted in CoPYRIGHT LAws,
supra note 9.
71. See, e.g., id. art. 20 (France); Law of Apr. 22, 1941, No. 633, art. 23 (Italy),
reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS, supra note 9. One writer states that enforcement of the
moral right by public officials was rejected in Germany because it offered the possibility
that the government would "steer" culture, a sore point in Germany after the Nazi
experience. See E. Marcus, The Moral Right of the Artist in Germany, Dec. 1975
(unpublished paper in author's file).
1042 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
May 1976] THE REFRIGERATOR OF BERNARD BUFFET 1043
moral right. International experience with the transplantation, as dis-
tinguished from the adaptation, of legal institutions has not been en-
couraging. We can learn from the French-German-Italian-Spanish ex-
perience, but we must develop our own method of employing its
lessons.72
Since the notion of moral right is foreign in origin, it seems
reasonable to ask whether it is in some basic sense alien to American
ideals and experience. In this connection it should be emphasized, first,
that the moral right is the product of legal development in western,
bourgeois, capitalist nations with whom we have deep cultural affinity.
Much of our own culture is derived or directly imported from Greece,
Italy, France, Germany, and Spain. Even though our legal traditions
often seem quite different from theirs, the differences are superimposed
on a common, shared cultural base. That is one reason why the
occasional adaptation of novel (to us) civil law institutions has been
accomplished without undue difficulty. The condominium is a recent
example; community property is a somewhat older one. Second, it is
difficult to argue that the concern for the right- of integrity is very
different from more familiar legal concerns, such as the right to privacy
and the interest in freedom from defamation and the infliction of
indignity or emotional distress. These also are based in part on respect
for the personality, identity, and reputation of the individual, and pro-
tection of the integrity of the work of art is, in a sense, merely a logical
extension of that concern to the peculiar problems of visual artists.
It might be argued that the artist can always protect the interest
involved in the right of integrity by including appropriate provisions in
the original agreement of a sale of the work, and indeed some artists try
to do so. However, for most artists that is not a workable suggestion.
They do not, as a general rule, execute formal agreements on the sale of
their work. (Perhaps they should do so, but at present few attempt it.)
Most have never thought of doing such a thing and would not know
how to go at it if the problem were in their minds; others shrink from
negotiations and bargaining. Nor is the artist, particularly when young
and unknown, in a very powerful bargaining position. If the buyer (or
the artist's dealer) resists, it is hard for the artist to insist.
An additional problem grows out of the fact that works of art
change hands. Even if the first owner expressly agrees to respect the
72. It seems reasonable to hope, however, that solutions adopted in the United
States will be compatible with the language of article 6-bis of the Berne Convention,
which has been adopted by more than 50 nations. See note 9 supra.
work, there is no way of securely binding his successors. The notion of
a servitude of the sort commonly attached to land by private agreement
depends for its effectiveness on notice to subsequent takers; a purchaser
without notice of the restriction takes free of it. Such a system of
servitude works reasonably well for land both because of the system of
public records (and the notion of "record notice") and because of the
apparentness of many kinds of servitudes to one who physically inspects
the land.73 But there is no equivalent system of public records of
transactions affecting paintings, drawings, and sculpture. And most
works of art would be unacceptably defaced by any attempt to attach
notice of restrictions to them in some permanent and indelible, and at
the same time reasonably apparent, way.
For these reasons it seems right to suggest that, if the matter is to
be the subject of express agreement, the burden should be on the
purchaser. This could most simply be accomplished by establishing a
legal right of integrity in the work of art and requiring one who wished
to take free of the restriction, or to be subsequently freed of it, to acquire
the artist's consent. That, in effect, is the situation under the Berne
Convention and in several nations, including Germany.74
In France, however, we are confronted by the statutory provision
that the moral right is "perpetuel, inalienable et imprescriptible."75
What this has come to mean with respect to the right of integrity is that
waivers of the right by the artist are not enforceable against him. It
does not mean that the artist's consent to reasonable modifications of the
work is ineffective. The position, developed primarily in the literary
and motion picture fields, seems to be that agreement to a specific
modification is possible if it seems reasonable and not seriously damag-
ing or distorting to the work.76 The obvious intention is to prevent the
artist from adhering to an agreement he may have been too weak or too
innocent to resist.
73. For a discussion of covenants running with the land and equitable servitudes
see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 9.1-.40 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
74, See note 9 supra.
75. Law of Mar. 11, 1956, No. 57-296, art. 6, reprinted in COPYRIGHr LAWS, supra
note 9. The Italian statute also provides that the components of the moral right are
inalienable and adds: "However, if the author was aware of and accepted modifications
in his work, he shall not be entitled to intervene to prevent the performance thereof or to
demand its suppression." Law of Apr. 22, 1941, No. 633, art. 22, as amended, Law of
Aug. 23, 1946, No. 82, reprinted in UNESCO, supra note 9. The French rule of
inalienability is also qualified, but in a slightly different way. See text accompanying
note 76 infra.
76. See DESBOIS, supra note 7, at 489-95.
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Thus three major positions can be identified. One position is that
of the United States, which places the burden on the artist to extract an
agreement from the purchaser, with the real danger that subsequent ac-
quirers of the work will not be bound by the agreement. The intermedi-
ate position, in the Berne Convention and the law of Germany, places
the burden on the purchaser to acquire the artist's consent if he wishes
to modify the work. The third position, in France (and in Italy, which
had a different but comparable rule), places the onus on the purchaser
and protects the artist against his own assent unless the modification of
the work is a reasonable one to which the artist has specifically assented.
There is room for argument about whether the Berne-German or the
Franch-Italian position is the preferable one, but little can be said in
favor of the United States rule, which leaves the artist with no possibility
of adequate protection.
What would be lost by introducing a "right of integrity" into our
law? A colleague has suggested that the right may unduly inhibit
interpretations of the work, using the example of a brilliant production
of a play that the author finds inconsistent with his intention in writing
it. The objection illustrates the difficulty of applying examples drawn
from one kind of art, such as drama, to another, such as painting,
drawing, or sculpture. The performance of a play and the reproduction
of a painting are not equivalent, for a variety of reasons. Most funda-
mentally, a play is meant to be produced, and this necessarily involves
interpretation. A painting is meant to be seen, not performed. The
proper analogy to reproduction of a painting is reproduction (for exam-
ple, by publishing) of the text of a play. The moral right of the author
would be impaired by a distortion of the play (for example, by substan-
tive changes made in the text without the author's consent) just as the
moral right of the painter is offended by unauthorized alteration of his
work. The question of the permissible limits of interpretation of a
painting (by paintings "after" the work of another artist, parodies,
tableaux vivants) is clearly distinguishable from the question of the
permissible limits of treatment of the original work itself.
Different forms of creative expression are typically divulged in
different ways. A dance or a play is performed, a novel is published, a
painting is exhibited. Another significant difference lies in the net-
works of institutions and relationships associated with the forms of
creation. The world of the performing arts, for example, is quite
separate from that of the visual arts, and both are readily distinguishable
from the literary world. Visual artists, dealers, galleries, collectors,
museums, auction houses, art critics, art historians, and the art press
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
cohere in a dense pattern of complex relationships that gives the visual
art world a distinct identity. The performing and literary arts worlds
are similarly distinct and coherent and seldom impinge significantly on
the visual art world. It should not seem surprising that problems of
vital importance to one of these will be of only marginal interest to the
others. 7
One consequence of the separate existence of a visual arts world, a
performing arts world, and a literary arts world is the possibility of
overkill. Whatever may have been the perceived threat that led the
motion picture and television industries to fear the moral right,78 it can
hardly have been concern about loss of their freedom to mistreat paint-
ings and sculpture. Yet, copyright laws and treaties generally lump all
protected forms of expression together. This places all forms at the
mercy of the one associated with the most powerful interests.
It seems unlikely that a right of integrity of works of visual art
would impair any respectable social interest. By adding to the catalog
of legally enforceable rights it might add to the burden on legislatures,
courts, and lawyers. That additional burden can be translated into
social cost, but seldom is-and in any case few law reforms are costless
in those terms.
A potentially more serious objection is to the possible misuse of the
right of integrity. This translates into a concern about the proper initial
definition and subsequent judicial treatment of an unfamiliar legal
concept. Might it be pressed too far, misapplied, made the basis for
plausible but really undesirable claims? That is initially a problem of
legal technique: careful legislative draftsmanship supported by thought-
ful explanation and documentation is the basic requirement. Beyond
that point it is difficult to imagine that the right of integrity would create
unusually troubling problems of interpretation and application.
77. An example is the so-called droit de suite, or proceeds right, provided for
visual artists under French and German law and recently much discussed in the United
States. The proceeds right is the right of the artist to participate in the subsequent resale
of the work of art. It is not comparable to the author's right to royalties, although the
comparison is frequently made-usually by partisans of the proceeds right who argue
that artists are treated badly because they do not receive royalties. In fact, an artist who
copyrights his work can get royalties for its reproduction, just as the author does for his
novel. Moreover, like the American artist, the author has no right to a piece of the price
received if the original object itself-his manuscript-is resold by its owner (for
example, if the author's manuscript of a Faulkner novel is auctioned.) But as it
happens, royalties for reproduction of a copyrighted work are normally of little value to
a visual artist and the proceeds right unimportant to an author; conversely, royalties are
important to writers and proceeds rights are energetically sought by artists.
78. See note 9 supra.
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It is tempting to dramatize some of the right of integrity cases as
conflicts between the right of property and the moral right. In
Lacasse,79 Felseneiland mit Sirenen,80 and Crimi,81 so the argument
might go, the right of integrity of the artist came into conflict with the
right of the owner of the property to which the work was attached, and
in each case the artist lost. The force of this suggestion is diminished by
language in Crimi and other American cases denying the existence of a
right of integrity, so that no conflict of rights arose in them. Lacasse is
explainable by lack of the bishop's knowledge of or assent to the
frescoes in the church. This leaves Felseneiland mit Sirenen as the only
case in point. There the court did wrestle with the suggested conflict
and held for the artist; it was only in dictum that the court suggested
that the owner might prevail if he destroyed, rather than altered, the
painting. That is a slender thread on which to hang so heavy a
generalization.
There is another sense in which the right of integrity (and the
other components of the moral right) appears to come into conflict with
property rights-if by property rights one means the right of the owner
to deal with the thing as he wishes. The right of integrity arguably
reduces to some extent the owner's legal power over the work of art by
forbidding him to modify it. Consequently one whose definition of
property rights is based on a priori religious, philosophical, or political
preconceptions-as most definitions of property are-may well see the
right of integrity as an infringement or limitation of the property right of
the owner of the work of art. Conversely, a thorough positivist will
insist that property rights are defined (for legal purposes) by the
positive legal order, so that the right of integrity-like the law of
nuisance or zoning-is merely one element of the legal definition of the
right of property and consequently cannot be in conflict with it.
It is only slightly unfair to suggest that the positivist evades the
question and the apriorist begs it. That question is how to decide
whether to modify the existing law to create a right of integrity in works
of art. Strictures about protecting or limiting -the right of property
seldom advance the rational discussion of that question, since they
usually assume rather than seek the answer. Still, it is necessary to
address the concern of those who perceive the right of integrity as a
threat and who phrase their anxiety in property terms.
79. See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
80. See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 40-42 & accompanying text supra.
One aspect of that concern can be met by examining the extent to
which legitimate expectations are threatened by the right of integrity. At
the core of the right is the rule that the owner cannot alter the object
itself-the piece of painting or sculpture-without the artist's consent.
Does such a rule seriously impair the reasonable expectations of those
who acquire works of art? Do American collectors and museums place
a significant value on their liberty to change the artist's product?
The more significant and difficult questions arise as one leaves the
core conception and moves toward the periphery-toward claims like
those advanced in De Chirico,82 ULger,83 Bergerot,84 and Lacasse.
Those cases suggest extensions of the basic right of integrity, and it is
significant that in France, the nation in which the moral right is most
advanced, all of them were decided in a manner that should reassure
the most anxious property rights advocate. De Chirico, Bergerot and
Lacasse were decided against the artist. Lgger granted only a right to
published notice of the alteration.
There remains the nagging question whether these cases were
properly decided. In this connection consider Lacasse together with
Crimi and Liger. In each case it can be argued that the work of art-
frescoes in Lacasse and Crimi and stage settings in LUger-was ancillary
to some principal thing-churches in Lacasse and Crimi and an opera
in Lger. (Indeed, in LUger the court expressly found that the stage
settings were ancillary and that the opera existed without them.) These
cases thus involve conflicts between claims in different things, not
conflicting claims in the same thing. It is not a sufficient answer in such
cases that the artist has a right of integrity in the work of art; it is also
necessary to show that the defendant's interest in other property should
yield to that right. In Lacasse the court held for the bishop, who
neither knew of nor authorized execution of the frescoes in the church.
In Lgger there was a compromise: the producers of the opera could
suppress the scene but had to inform the public (and presumably could
not destroy the setting for the scene). The result in Crimi, however, is
troubling precisely because the resolution was so drastic: effacement of
the frescoes in the church, even though they had originally been com-
missioned by and executed for the responsible congregation. Such a
result was possible only because the New York court found no counter-
vailing legal interest in the artist. Crimi illustrates an unworthy and
intolerable hiatus in our law.
82. See notes 27-31 & accompanying text supra.
83. See note 20 & accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 23-26 & accompanying text supra.
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The current copyright revision proposals before Congress include
no provisions on integrity of works of art. One reason has already been
alluded to: the comfortable, but incorrect, argument that our law
already deals adequately with the problem.85  The matter deserves
reconsideration on the basis of a more accurate understanding of the
substantial distance that lies between protection of the integrity of the
work of art in other parts of the world and the feeble functional
equivalents in our law. Only after we have conceded that the distance is
appreciable can we begin the dialogue about how to deal properly with
the problem it symbolizes.
85. See notes 32-40 & accompanying text supra. Another possible reason for
failure to address the question in current copyright revision drafts is the belief that the
matter is one for the states. Emphasis on a distinction between copyright and rights of
personality reinforces that view, while the habit of including moral right protection in
national copyright laws and the Berne Convention argues for assimilation of the right of
integrity to the copyright clause of the United States Constitution. See Nimmer,
Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States
Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REv. 499, 518-19 (1967).
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